Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it is any consolation

to you—you mentioned the fact that since you have chaired this

committee for the last 4 years, you have held more hearings on

North Korea—it occurred to me when I looked at Ambassador

Gallucci, who will be on panel two, and remember the number of

meetings that we had under a prior management agreement that

was changed in 1994 with respect to chairing committees in the

Senate and the House, but that we too had spent more time I believe

on this particular topic in this particular country and the very

serious problems that confront us than any other single country

that I recall during that period.

And I would have to say that with respect to the support, although

in some cases either reluctant or with some reservations,

given some of the incidents that you have referred to, I have generally

married your position in terms of support for the agreement,

but I have had some very pointed questions.

Ambassador Gallucci was kind enough to smile and say, I hope

that you will ask me some again today. I said I would take his

name in vain a time or two when we were discussing the evolution

of this particular Agreed Framework, et cetera. But the hearing

today is certainly timely. The concerns that you have raised in your

opening statement are extremely important, and I look forward to

hearing from our witnesses.

Thank you.

That reminds me that we had a hearing here yesterday about the

question of access after fighting a war. And it remains one of the

most contentious issues that we have to deal with. And I recognize

that this is the subject of future negotiation, and you would not

want to put all of your bottom-line cards on the table, and saying,

this is our position and we are not going to negotiate. But is it fair

to assume that the question of access would be an absolute prerequisite

or some other condition of certifiability, however we get

into that particular maze that we sometimes enter, in terms of

going forward at some point?

Again, I will not ask you for the precise timeframe, but can we

assume that without some satisfactory, reliable, certifiable means

of assessing the situation, that this would, in effect, be regarded as,

by itself, a full breach of the Agreed Framework?

A dangerous thing to come even here to testify,

in most cases.

That is what I am asking you to deal with.

Well, if I recall, if I may interject for just a moment,

when it was originally negotiated—and, again, I am attempting

to paraphrase, if not quote, Ambassador Gallucci—it was designed

in such a way that each step would be verifiable and independent

and it would not rely on the good faith or trust of any one

involved. And if you are suggesting that it would simply bring

about a cessation in terms of forward progress rather than a complete

collapse of the Agreed Framework, then I understand your

answer.

I would like to go back to the question of alternative

sources of weapons-grade or weapons-usable plutonium for

just a minute. But before we depart from the heavy fuel oil part

of the agreement which the United States is obliged to fulfill, acknowledging

that we are short 340,000–350,000 metric tons at this

point, when do you think, given all that you know about the circumstances including the mood in Congress, when do you think

that will be accomplished and how do you think it will be paid for?

So, in other words, you believe at this point you

have both the resources and the authority to fulfill the current

year’s requirement for delivery of heavy fuel oil?

Very briefly, on the question of the alignment between

ourselves, the ROK, and Japan on the Agreed Framework,

and our discussions, the Four Party Talks, that have at various

times been regarded as possible avenues to more progress, could

you characterize where those things stand generally? I am not sure

that the message that I received from representatives of those governments

in Washington and/or foreign ministers and others—and

we will have an opportunity to get a direct message here in about

an hour and a half from one of those representatives—but I am not

sure that I am as sanguine about the complete uniformity of current

thinking as I would like to be.

But even before the missile test—and I assume

that there was an exchange, so that they were not unaware of the

fact that such a test might take place, and I will just leave it at

that in this forum—I detected some hesitancy about the firmness

of the commitment to the billion dollars of the Agreed Framework

from time to time and/or some hesitancy at least based on lack of

additional guarantees and participation in terms of wherewithal by

the United States. Would you comment on that?

What has been the impact of the ceremonies that

took place in Pyongyang yesterday or the day before—I have forgotten

now in terms of the passage of time—as well as the most recent

submarine incident, et cetera? Have those events or even the fact

that Kim Jong-il did not assume the title that his father, the Great

Leader, had had—do any of those things, for those who like to engage

in over-analysis or psycho-babble, does that have any relevance

that you would want to comment on publicly?

Could I just ask one more question?

Do we have any expectation that there will be an official exchange

between a representative of the U.S. Government and Kim

Jong-il at any time in the near term, or that he will appear outside

of a heavily secured military installation to deliver any message to

the North Korean people?

It has been bronzed.

So the one silver lining is there is expected stability

at this point, if not progress. Thank you.

Well, just to continue that question and maybe

bring it to a close. I assume that you take the position that as long

as we continue to achieve our objective or meet the purposes of the

Agreed Framework agreement, that we ought to continue to consider

that largely in isolation from the other matters, particularly

with respect to proliferation of ballistic missiles, where we have

had arguably no success whatever.

And maybe that is a little harsh, but at least the progress has

been more difficult to document or measure in most of those other

areas. But you are saying—and I am really not arguing with you

at this point, because I think you can make the case that simply

achieving one identifiable, discrete objective purpose and continuing

to hold that in check, even though all the rest of the negotiations

or lack of negotiations or success is important, in and of itself,

and we ought not to give up on the one area that we have had success

to date simply because we are not making progress in other

areas that are also vitally important to us. Is that a fair summation?

OK. It is now your opportunity to——

Well, that is really what I was asking.

You mentioned the word ‘‘alternatives,’’ and I suggested

earlier on I wanted to address the question of produced at

home as opposed to imported plutonium, weapons grade, whatever

the case may be. I realize that we get very quickly into areas that

we should not get too specific, but in terms of just the large policy

tradeoffs that are involved, do you think that the worth of the current

freeze in terms of denying the ability to provide home-produced

enriched fissile material or whatever is important enough to

exclude an alternative sourcing as a—I am not quite sure how to

ask the question without getting into an area that I do not think

we want to go—at least not in this venue.

I think that is a good place to leave it.

What in your judgment would be the consequences

of a breach in the Agreed Framework, acknowledging at

this point that we have an obligation to provide 500 metric tons of

heavy fuel oil and we have only provided I think 152, if the current

math is correct—whatever? In any event, we are in less than full

compliance on our end at this point. And many would want to negotiate

or renegotiate that particular point. And maybe Ambassador

Gallucci will have more to say about that in a few minutes.

But, in any event, if either side were to be regarded by the other

as being in clear breach or violation of the agreement, what do you

believe the near-term consequences would be in terms of what kind

of changes take place in the dynamics at the time that acknowledged

breach occurs?

That is obviously what I am thinking of.